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Europe’s defence train has left the station 
– speed and destination unknown  
Steven Blockmans 
he Shakespearean theatricals surrounding the decision to move to phase II of the Brexit 
negotiations obscure another momentous European development. The EU’s formal 
launch of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ in the area of defence at the December 
summit of the European Council pushes the integration process forward and may be hugely 
significant for both the strategic autonomy of the UK and the strengthening of the European 
pillar within NATO.  
Yet, almost 65 years after the demise of the European Defence Community Treaty, in a 
French parliament reluctant to pool and share hard core sovereign powers with post-war 
Germany, the implementation of the ‘winter package’ does not represent a giant leap 
towards a common defence, much less the budding ‘EU army’ that some EU leaders would 
have us believe. 
At the hard core of state sovereignty 
Lack of political will and mutual trust among EU member states has long been an obstacle to 
cooperation in security and defence. In the years that followed the financial crisis and overall 
austerity, defence budgets all over Europe were slashed in an uncoordinated manner, 
hollowing out most member states’ military capabilities. Facing a fraught security climate in 
the Arab world, the leaders of the EU member states meeting at the December 2013 
European Council decided to buck this trend. But delivery has lagged behind. 
In December 2016 the leaders of the member states instructed the EU institutions to prepare 
the ground for strengthening the Union’s common security and defence policy, thereby 
tapping into the political momentum generated by Russia’s assault on Ukraine, the prospect 
of Brexit and the unpredictability injected into US foreign policy by President Trump. 
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Twelve months later, a separate European defence fund has been created, as well as a 
permanent headquarters for (non-executive) military operations. In addition, the EU is now 
formally launching permanent structured cooperation (known as PESCO in EU lingo) between 
25 member states for the development and deployment of defence capabilities. Only 
Denmark (which has an opt-out from EU defence policy), Malta (which has a very small 
military) and the UK (which is leaving the EU) have chosen not to take this first step towards 
the broader goal of a European Defence Union. An annual review mechanism will monitor the 
implementation of commitments. 
Although this winter package was developed with remarkable speed in response to the need 
expressed by citizens for the EU to offer better protection against security threats, both 
within and outside its borders, the political rhetoric surrounding its launch has raised 
expectations that the EU may not be able to meet. 
Inclusivity vs level of ambition 
The first risk of delay comes with the German desire for inclusivity – i.e. having as many as 25 
member states on board in PESCO will ultimately hold up substantial progress in this field. 
While the level of ambition described in the initial policy documents has been maintained, 
decision-making by unanimity will prolong consensus politics and mean that the speed of 
European defence cooperation and integration is determined by the slowest wagon in the 
train.  
Poland may well replace the UK as the member state that most frequently slams on the 
brakes. In the face of Russian aggression, the country relies on the hard security guarantees 
provided by the US. Warsaw has long resisted the idea of EU defence integration for fear of 
undermining NATO’s resolve to come to the rescue in an hour of need. Political market forces 
unleashed by the prospect of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump have led the contrarian 
Polish government to sign up to a new chapter of European integration, no doubt driven by 
the thinking ‘if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em’. Rather than being left at the station, Poland 
jumped on Europe’s defence train, fully expecting to be able to slow it down and even change 
the direction of travel.  
This raises the question of whether projecting unity was more important to the architects of 
PESCO than using up a unique legal basis under the treaty that would have allowed for a 
greater level ambition with a smaller group of states. France – after Brexit the only member 
state with a nuclear and expeditionary force capacity – is already preparing for closer defence 
cooperation outside the framework of PESCO, in the sphere of external intervention. 
Second, the new European defence fund has been touted as a ‘game changer’ because it 
introduces an instrument whereby the European Commission can tap into the EU’s general 
budget to finance initiatives in the field of defence. Generally speaking, budget is policy. The 
plan to earmark €1.5 billion per year after 2020 to spend on military R&D (€0.5bn on research 
and €1bn on development and acquisition) is indeed ground-breaking, but it is also 
conditional on a future agreement on the EU’s post-Brexit multiannual financial framework. 
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Until 2020, €90 million is available for research and €500 million for development and 
acquisition.  
As things stand, the sums of money currently available and the co-financing arrangements to 
bring EU funds online for development and acquisition (in the form of a 20-30% top-up for 
proposals by consortia of companies from a minimum of two member states) will fail to 
produce the big bang the Union needs to create a military-industrial complex. The potential 
to “turbo boost” defence spending is likely to be restricted to EU-level initiatives that do not 
threaten national industries or local jobs, where transnational responses are required to meet 
current and future challenges, and where shortfalls are, relatively speaking, the biggest. The 
training, capability development and operational readiness of a European cyber shield, drone 
force and medical command come to mind. It is thus crucial that the collaborative projects 
developed in the experimental phase of an inclusive PESCO add real value at EU level. 
Differentiated integration in this field is occurring at the grassroots, not top down. Pioneering 
proposals from small consortia of member states could help raise the level of ambition 
overall, but for this upward convergence to materialise, the legal standards and requirements 
in the areas where projects are developed would need to be harmonised. 
Third, the creation of a ‘coordinated annual review on defence’ (CARD) depends on trust, 
which has historically been in short supply in Europe. The CARD system is designed to 
encourage EU member states to synchronise their budgets and capability plans. Increased 
transparency should allow member states and the European Defence Agency (the executive 
body entrusted with the task of strengthening the European defence industry and supporting 
military cooperation among the member states) to identify opportunities for joint projects in 
capability development and deployment, and to create peer pressure to spend more on 
defence (up to the level of 2% of GDP agreed to in NATO). Yet, as with the semester system in 
the eurozone, CARD operates on a voluntary basis. Short of the diplomatically unfriendly act 
of suspending a member state from PESCO, it is unclear how compliance with the binding 
commitments will be enforced. Also, without a common agreement on which (nationally 
produced) capabilities can be scrapped, the ulterior aim of rationalising the European defence 
market is unlikely to be reached any time soon. 
A new European security and defence architecture 
It is worth noting that none of these efforts are intended to duplicate or compete with NATO, 
but to streamline and improve the functioning of existing structures in the EU. In fact, NATO 
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has given his seal of approval to the EU’s initiatives, 
provided that the two organisations act in full complementarity. To that end, a whole raft of 
concrete proposals for enhanced cooperation in areas such as countering hybrid threats, 
cyber security and operational cooperation in the Mediterranean are being implemented. 
These measures do not depart from the modus operandi of European security and defence 
but help to banish certain ghosts from the past in coordination between the two Brussels-
based organisations.  
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National governments operate a single set of forces; thus by developing and using joint 
instruments the EU will strengthen capabilities that are also available to NATO and the United 
Nations. It goes without saying that this requires a strong commitment on the part of France 
and Germany. 
A stronger EU will also be in the UK’s interest once it has left the Union because it will need 
Europe’s backing to punch above its weight. But the key to success is greater strategic 
convergence, whereby member states and key partners on the EU’s borders fully recognise 
the link between the inevitable restructuring of their armed forces in the short term and the 
long-term added value of pooling and sharing military capabilities for sustainability and 
effectiveness. 
Seen in this light, the British government’s plans to forge a strong military partnership with 
the EU post-Brexit is a little ironic given that it always tried to block such progress as a 
member state. But such a strong partnership would be a qualitative leap towards meeting the 
challenges posed by a rapidly shifting security environment. 
